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Questions to Bichler and Nitzan 
by Corentin Debailleul 
n their most recent contribution to the Working Papers on Capital as Power, ‘The CasP 
Project: Past, Present and Future’ (2015 now published in Vol. 1, No. 3 in this journal), 
Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan invite readers to engage critically with their 
theoretical framework, known as capital as power (CasP). This call for further research, 
reactions and critiques is the perfect occasion to raise a few questions that have grown in my 
mind in reading Nitzan and Bichler’s work. 
In their book Capital as Power: A Study of Order and Creorder (2009), Nitzan and Bichler reject 
both neoclassical and Marxist perspectives in political economy, and they dedicate two full 
chapters to a critique of Marxism. The critique focuses mainly on the labour theory of value, as 
the authors identify it as the core foundation of Marx’s work. And indeed, the concept of 
exploitation – so central for many political parties, unions and activists – is built on this very 
theory. Hence calling into question the labour theory of value shakes not only the ground on 
which all Marxist economics rests, but also all Marxist praxis, for the two go hand in hand.  
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Nonetheless, while they dismiss neoclassical economics as an obfuscating faith, Nitzan and 
Bichler acknowledge that Marxism has some merits, both in their 2009 book and elsewhere. 
For example, in their article, ‘Capital as Power’ (Bichler and Nitzan 2012), they maintain that 
many Marxist insights are laudable: 
. . . both Marx and the neo-Marxists have had very meaningful things to say about the 
world. These include, among other things, a comprehensive vista of human history – an 
approach that negates and supersedes the particular histories dictated by elites; the 
notion that ideas are dialectically embedded in their concrete material history; the link 
between theory and praxis; the view of capitalism as a totalizing political-power 
regime; the universalizing-globalizing tendencies of this regime; the dialectics of the 
class struggle; the fight against exploitation, oppression and imperial rule; and the 
emphasis on autonomy and freedom as the motivating force of human development. 
In my view, this ambivalent relationship with Marx and his followers deserves further 
examination, as it could – through a dialectical process of embracing, rejecting and overcoming 
various Marxist stances – allow for the development of CasP. The following interrogates the 
imbrications between Marxism and CasP and can be seen as an invitation to start this 
confrontation. 
What is the role of social classes, class relations and class struggle in the CasP framework? Can 
a mode of power be defined by the nature of and relations between its constituting social 
classes? In Marxist theory, classes are defined by their position in a given mode of production. 
Are classes in CasP, in some kind of parallel to Marxism, defined by their position in global 
power relations? Is there a ruled class intrinsically at war with a ruling class, for instance? 
Marx stressed the importance of consistency between theory and action. As he famously 
stated, ‘Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to 
change it’. Surely, what Marxists have proposed or done in the name of Marx is extremely 
varied. But what CasP proponents have to offer in terms of praxis largely remains to be 
explored. In their most recent paper, Nitzan and Bichler write: 
. . . when activists ask us, ‘OK, so what do you recommend we do?’ our answer is simple: 
establish ten autonomous research institutes around the world, and you will have 
taken the first step toward changing it. There is enormous pent-up autonomous energy 
in the world, but most of it is undirected and therefore wasted. In order to change the 
world, you need to know what kind of world you want; in order to know what you want, 
you need to know what exists; and in order to know what exists, you need radical, 
autonomous – and therefore non-academic – re-search. 
While the proposal to create autonomous research centres is certainly interesting, it does not 
seem to me to go far enough. According to the Marxist tale, the working class is assigned the 
task of overthrowing the capitalist class and eventually abolishing all classes and producing 
communism. . . .  Because CasP presents itself as a radical critique of capitalism, one could 
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expect it to envision some path for the abolition of this order – in Hegelian terms, its Aufhebung 
or dialectical transcendence. Furthermore, someone inspired by anarchist thought may 
wonder whether the aim of such a revolution should be the creordering of a new (better) mode 
of power, or whether the end of all modes of power should be favoured instead. Here, the tough 
issue of defining ‘power’ arises.  
Finally, I want to stress one point that has often been mobilised to criticise Marxism: its 
economic determinism, or tendency to link every single thing to the mode of production or so-
called base. Nitzan and Bichler have developed a conceptualisation of capital that seems to 
encompass many (if not all) human interactions. Their Mumfordian depiction of our social 
order as a megamachine dedicated to capital accumulation – which they call the state of capital 
– might be subject to similar accusations of determinism and reductionism. 
Hence the question: what exactly is the relevant area of CasP in today’s globalising society? To 
what does it and does it not apply? Are there relations that cannot be described as power 
relations? Or that cannot be labelled ‘capitalist’? That are legacies from past modes of power, 
for instance? Or that prefigure the world ‘we’ want to create? 
These questions must be addressed both practically and theoretically, individually and 
collectively. This intervention is intended as an invitation for Nitzan and Bichler to articulate 
or clarify their positions, and for others to join the discussion as well. 
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Theory and Praxis, Theory and Practice, Practical Theory 
by Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan 
In his intervention, Corentin Debailleul raises several related questions, of which three seem 
paramount: (1) What are the overlaps and differences between CasP and Marx? (2) How does 
CasP relate to the concepts of class and class struggle? And perhaps most importantly, (3) what 
is the CasP praxis?  
These questions are not new. They have been raised often and in various forms, mostly by 
sceptical-, former- and post-Marxists wishing to build bridges between the old and the new. 
Our two books, The Global Political Economy of Israel (Nitzan and Bichler 2002) and Capital as 
Power: A Study of Order and Creorder (Nitzan and Bichler 2009), along with the growing body 
of CasP research, provide some insight into these questions. But these insights offer no more 
than a starting point. As we indicated in ‘The CasP Project: Past, Present, Future’ (Bichler and 
Nitzan 2015), there is a need for a much deeper, broader and more systematic exploration, an 
inquiry that we invite others to participate in and which we hope to contribute to in our 
ongoing study of Concepts of Power, Modes of Power. In this article we offer a few interim 
thoughts instigated by Debailleul’s queries. 
Communists and Anarchists 
In 2001, the Israeli Communist Party invited us to present our newly published Hebrew book, 
From War Profits to Peace Dividends (Bichler and Nitzan 2001), at the party’s local in Lower 
Haifa.  
The invitation was somewhat surprising. The Israeli (formerly Palestinian) Communist Party 
was never a model of open-mindedness and autonomy. Founded in the 1920s, its 
‘revolutionary praxis’ has been marked by numerous twists, turns and uneasy adaptations. 
The Party managed to stomach the Soviet purges of the 1930s, in which many of its own 
Comintern founders/supporter were executed; it survived the nationalist-socialist split 
ushered in by the 1936-9 Arab Revolt in Palestine; it braved the 1960s conflict between the 
Nasserites and pro-Moscow factions; it endured the contradictions between Arab nationalism 
and universal socialism; it kept its eyes wide shut in the face of Moscow’s realpolitik in the 
region (including its abandonment of communist prisoners in Egypt and Iraq); during the 
Second Palestinian Intifada, it walked the tightrope between supporting narrow-minded 
religious terrorism and promoting enlightened secular bi-nationalism; the list goes on. 
It was never entirely clear whether these ‘revolutionary practices’ aligned with or contradicted 
the Party’s ‘revolutionary theory’ – or maybe neither was revolutionary, and it was simply a 
case of an atrophied Party oligarchy ignoring a rigid theory that no longer suited its various 
manoeuvres. One way or the other, the invitation offered us a golden opportunity to engage 
with one of the last Stalinist parties on earth – and that alone was worth the effort, if only for 
the anthropological experience. 
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The first rows of the lecture hall were all taken by Party elders, many holding walking sticks 
and wearing hearing aids. Their view of capitalism was delineated by clear dualities. As far as 
they were concerned, the world was split between base and superstructure, economics and 
politics, determinism and vitalism and theory and praxis, and these dualities, most of them 
believed, held together or fell apart depending on the ups and downs of class consciousness 
and class struggle – or, in more ‘political’ terms, the wisdom of the Party and the zeal of its 
followers. 
The elders were particularly keen to hear from us that the Israeli occupation of Palestinian 
territories and the country’s refusal to allow for a Palestinian state were rooted in ‘objective 
economic interests’. They wanted us to confirm that, in the final analysis, the history of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict was anchored in production, exploitation and accumulation à la 
Marx and imperialism à la Lenin.  
We tried to explain to them that this type of naïve Marxism-Leninism was no longer 
fashionable. Leading Marxists like Harry Magdoff, we pointed out, had already shown thirty 
years earlier that accumulation was no longer dependent on the direct occupation of colonies 
and that the United States invaded Vietnam not in order to enrich a few bankers and arms 
dealers, but to protect the entire capitalist system from the so-called domino effect of creeping 
communism (Magdoff 1969, 1972, 2003).  
Similarly with Israel. The country’s largest corporations had no use for occupied Palestinian 
land. Israel’s dominant capital, we told the politicos, had gone global long ago, and its 
differential accumulation was by now nearly perfectly correlated with the U.S. NASDAQ. It 
certainly didn’t depend on the cheapness of Palestinian labour, let alone the tiny Palestinian 
market. Even the most basic cost-benefit analysis showed that Israeli capitalists were set to 
gain from a ‘new Middle East’ à la Shimon Peres: with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolved, 
they would be able to invest freely in the region, generating ‘peace dividends’ far larger than 
their former war profits.  
Our failure to economise the occupation didn’t endear us to the die-hard Stalinists, and some 
of them were visibly dozing. But when we introduced our theory of Middle East Energy 
Conflicts, they quickly straightened their backs and adjusted the volume on their hearing aids. 
The issue, we explained, is not that the occupation is unrelated to accumulation, but rather that 
this relationship has to be understood in the much broader context of the global political 
economy and the ways in which Israel has been embedded in the regional and global logic of 
capital. 
Our audience was again attentive. Regional wars, we told them, were intimately connected to 
differential oil profits, and that connection was enough to rekindle excitement. Profit, they all 
knew, was a ‘real’ economic variable, and with this anchor having been safely secured, 
everything else fell into place: the extraction, refining and consumption of oil involved 
relations of production; relations of production connected to class conflict; and class conflict 
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was intertwined with domestic politics and international relations – i.e., with the Party’s 
exclusive expertise.  
But the excitement quickly fizzled. We demonstrated to the senior luminaries that differential 
profits in the oil business were dependent almost entirely on differential prices, and that 
variations in production (i.e., the ‘real economy’) were relatively insignificant. And that 
demonstration was too much for them to bear.  
One vocal opponent – an emeritus professor of physics – was particularly flabbergasted. The 
professor – who incidentally was a former student of David Bohm when the latter, on his 
escape route from American McCarthyism, taught briefly at the Israeli Technicon – was 
puzzled by our indifference to ‘materialism’. How could oil profits – whether absolute or 
differential – be independent of the physical production of oil? Why do we insist on the 
primacy of prices and finance when it is patently clear that accumulation is rooted in the 
‘reality’ of production? As a theoretical physicist, he steadfastly believed that economic reality 
was ultimately a matter of use values (‘stuff’), and that accumulation must be countable in units 
of production and consumption. Everything else – from prices and money to credit and finance 
– was mere reflection, speculation, accounting tricks or simple hallucinations. We politely 
pointed out that he himself had never seen a single ‘real’ atom, let alone an electron or a proton, 
and that his entire physics was symbolic, based on nothing but chemical hallucinations, but he 
was unfazed. 
All in all, we failed to impress the front rowers. Our dogmatic research was obviously no match 
for the eternal theories of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. But then, when the Q&A session finally ended 
and the gathering came to a close, we were approached by a young, athletic guy with broad 
shoulders and piercing eyes. ‘I’m an anarchist’, he announced with a hint of a smile. ‘I have no 
patience for theoretical dogma and fancy words. I want revolutionary praxis. Just give me the 
bottom line: who do I need to shoot?’ 
Arrow in the Blue 
And so the left finds itself in an infinite regress, oscillating between the arrow and the blue.2 
The men and women of action, teetering on the verge of praxis, look for clear guidance. They 
want an ‘objective’ template to tell them what is to be done. But this objective template is 
nowhere to be found. The old theoretical scriptures no longer offer unequivocal instructions. 
Having been sanctified, immortalized and fossilized, they shed less and less light on the rapidly 
changing world. They can no longer be simply read and followed. They need to be 
deconstructed, interpreted and adjusted to the ever-changing reality. They require political 
leaders, academic pundits, media intellectuals and other mediators who know how to pick and 
                                                          
2 In Arthur Koestler’s autobiography Arrow in the Blue (1952), the arrow was a metaphor for action, the blue for 
contemplation. Koestler engaged in both, but claimed he could never engage with both at the same time. 
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choose the right words that the faithful can easily follow. But then, if the ‘correct’ action is 
vetted by go-betweens, who needs objective theory to start with? 
And indeed, nowadays very few activists think they do. The anti-globalization and Occupy 
movements of the new millennium started their journey with lofty autonomous ideals and 
plenty of media coverage, but soon enough found themselves falling back on new/old slogans. 
They condemned imperialism and financialism, called on governments to nationalize the 
banks and de-subsidize the large corporations and demanded that income be redistributed 
downward and debts be cancelled. But slogans do not produce new insight to tell us how the 
world actually works. Lacking conviction, they ebb and flow with the stock-market cycle. They 
are no match for, let alone offer an alternative to, the rising radical right.  
To democratize society, to unleash autonomy, to plan for a better, sustainable future, we need 
to understand how capitalism operates – both in general and in detail. The reason for this 
requirement is very simple. Social change, no matter how radical, is never complete. It never 
creates a clean slate, an entirely new society built from scratch. Lineages from the past always 
remain, and these remaining lineages tend to be, at least in the beginning, much more 
important than those than have been severed. This ever-present, dialectical enfoldment of the 
past within the present means that, for change to be effective, we must understand exactly 
what is it that we seek to alter. And such an understanding requires that we give up our 
theoretical fixations and ideological rigidities.   
Historically, one of Marxism’s greatest political appeals was its totalizing nature. During the 
1930s, many communists, particularly in Europe, were convinced that Marxism offered them 
a ‘theory of everything’. It promised insight into all aspects of society, and this insight, they 
believed, would enable the Communist Party to change everything. This belief galvanized 
action, cemented conviction and mustered the type of social energy that only religion can 
amass. But it also sowed the seeds of the theory’s own demise.  
As Hegel pointed out, no theory of society can transcend its historical epoch. For social theory, 
no matter how elegant, robust and comprehensive, is always part of the very society it seeks 
to describe, preserve or change. The purpose of a theory, we might posit, is to creorder – or 
create the order of – society. In the language of Ulf Martin (2010), theories of capitalism and 
the social structure they construct are ‘operational symbols’ – that is, symbols that describe 
and organize other symbols. And operational symbols are often autopoietic: self-creating and 
self-transforming. In other words, when a theory imposes its logic on and transforms society, 
it necessarily undermines its own prior coherence and therefore must be revised or discarded 
altogether.  
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From Marx to CasP 
Although we are critical of key aspects of Marx’s theory, his work is deeply enfolded in our 
own. The following paragraphs, taken from our book Capital as Power (Nitzan and Bichler 
2009), summarize some of these lineages – as well as the reason why they must be re-
examined: 
As radical thinkers, we find it far more difficult to criticize Marx than the neoclassicists. 
So much of our thinking about capitalism originates from his writings. The very concept 
of the ‘capitalist system’; the view of capital as a political institution and of political 
critique as part of the class struggle; the emphasis on the ruling class and the socio-
historical context in which it emerges; the dialectical development of history in general 
and of capital accumulation in particular; the imperative of empirical research; the 
universalizing tendencies of capital – these ideas and emphases are all due to Marx. It 
is hard to approach contemporary social phenomena – from globalization, to economic 
crisis, to militarization, imperialism, ecology, price movements, the modern 
corporation, cultural development, elite dynamics and technical change, to name a few 
– without feeling indebted to Marx and the controversies he opened up. His insights, 
along with the debates among his followers and critics, are deeply embedded in our 
current thinking.  
But then it is precisely this crucial importance of Marx – along with his emphasis on 
dialectical thinking – that forces us to re-examine his underlying framework. 
Capitalism, he argued, is a system of commodities, driven by the accumulation of capital 
and denominated in prices. To decipher the secrets of this process is to look behind the 
front window of prices, and to do so we need a theory of value. This is the starting point, 
the ‘algorithm’ that Marx uses to develop much of his subsequent concepts and analysis. 
Marx chose to develop a value theory based on labour, and it is here that his analysis 
went wrong. Our purpose in this and the next chapter is to examine why. What are the 
inconsistencies in Marx’s logic, how has the development of capitalism undermined 
that logic, and most importantly, what can we learn from these theoretical and 
historical considerations as we seek to develop a radical alternative? (84) 
One of the key shortcomings of Marx’s approach is that it accepts – however critically – the 
liberal duality of economics versus politics and in so doing makes it hard if not impossible to 
transcend the ‘materialist’ notion capital. As we noted in Capital as Power (2009), initially 
the notion that capital was a purely economic category hardly seemed problematic. 
With economics considered separable from politics, with aggregate concepts yet to be 
invented and diffused, and with the basic social data still to be created, it was possible 
to believe that capital was an objectively defined economic entity with a readily 
measurable quantity. There was really nothing to contest that belief. (41) 
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But this belief didn’t last for long. While capitalism expanded and globalized as Marx predicted, 
its character was transformed radically, and in ways that Marx’s theory could not easily 
accommodate. Below we outline some of these changes, as summarized in Capital as Power 
(2009): 
The turning point came at the end of the nineteenth century. Recall that classical 
political economy differed from all prior myths of society in that it was the first to 
substitute secular for religious force. But note also that this secular notion of force was 
similar to its religious predecessor in that it was still heteronomous. It was external to 
society. For the political economist, economic forces were as objective as natural laws. 
They were determined for human beings, not by human beings. 
This external perception of force began to crack during the second half of the 
nineteenth century. More and more processes seemed to deviate from the automaticity 
implied by the natural laws of economics. Increasingly, force was subjectified by 
society, seen as determined for human beings, by human beings. Challenged and 
negated, heteronomous force gradually re-emerged as autonomous power.  
The change in perception was affected by several important developments. First, the 
rise of large governments and big business undermined the Newtonian logic of 
competitive markets and political equilibrium. At the turn of the twentieth century, it 
was already clear that the guiding hand of the market was not always invisible and that 
liberal politics was far from equal. Power now was much more than a theoretical 
addendum needed simply to ‘close’ an otherwise incomplete economic model; it was 
an overwhelming historical reality, one that seemed to define the very nature of 
capitalism. This recognition cast further doubt on the possibility of purely economic 
categories.  
Second, the emergence of the aggregate view of the economy, the development of 
national accounting and the requirements of statistical estimates revealed serious 
difficulties with the measurement of capital. For the first time, political economists had 
to put the concepts of utility and abstract labour into statistical practice, and the result 
was disastrous.  
According to received doctrine, the ‘real’ quantity of capital is denominated in units of 
utility or abstract labour. But there is a caveat. As we shall see later in the book, such 
measurements are meaningful, if at all, only under conditions of perfectly competitive 
equilibrium. This qualification creates a bit of a headache since, by definition, perfectly 
competitive equilibrium evaporates when infected by power. And given that even 
orthodox economists now agree that power is everywhere (if only as a ‘distortion’), it 
follows that the theoretical units of ‘real’ capital are meaningless and that their practical 
measures break down. In fact, it turns out that even when we assume perfectly 
competitive equilibrium it is still logically impossible to observe and measure the utility 
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or abstract labour contents of capital. And so, by attempting to measure the so-called 
‘real’ quantity of capital, economists ended up exposing it for what it was: a fiction 
hanging by the threads of impossible assumptions and contradictory logic.  
Third, and more broadly, the new reality of the twentieth century didn’t quite fit the 
traditional way in which liberals and Marxists separated economics from politics. 
There was a massive rise in the purchasing power of workers in the capitalist 
countries, an uptrend that contradicted the cyclical patterns suggested by Malthus, 
Ricardo and Marx, and that therefore blurred their basic notion of ‘subsistence’. Many 
types of labour became complex and skilled, rather than one-dimensional and simple 
as Marx had anticipated – a development that made the notion of ‘abstract labour’ 
difficult if not impossible to apply. And in contrast to the expectations of many radicals, 
profit cycles failed to implode capitalism, while the profit rate – although oscillating – 
trended sideways rather than down. Culture, media and consumerism became no less 
crucial for accumulation than production was. Inflation supplemented cost cutting as a 
key mechanism of redistribution, while finance took over the factory floor as the locus 
of power. Emerging categories of technology, corporate planning and public 
management could not easily be classified as either economic or political. It became 
increasingly clear that free competition and bourgeois ownership were insufficient, 
even as a starting point, to explain the nature and development of modern capitalism.  
The very notion of class became contested. As an analytical tool, class originally 
emerged from a triple fusion of Ricardo’s theory of labour value, Comte’s industrial 
management and Marx’s capital accumulation. The emphasis of class analysis on 
capitalists and workers was unmediated and obvious; it was materially embedded, 
ideologically accepted and legally enforced; and until the late nineteenth century it 
served both the liberal mainstream and its Marxist critiques.  
But by the early twentieth century, the vision of class analysis had become blurred. 
Although still linked in some sense to material reality, class was now increasingly 
intertwined with political organizations and parties, culture, mass psychology and 
sociology. It was no longer immediate or obvious. It required subtle articulation. It 
became a speculative concept.  
Worse still, class was now competing with new concepts, particularly the ‘masses’. The 
twentieth century brought fascism, a new regime that rejected the Enlightenment, cast 
off rationalism and shifted the entire ideological emphasis of social theory. Instead of 
production, fascism accentuated power; in lieu of class, it spoke of state, organization 
and oligarchy. Following fascism, social scientists began to emphasize a new set of 
categories – ‘mass’, ‘crowd’, ‘bureaucracy’, ‘elite’ and, eventually, the ‘system’ – 
categories that appeared more flexible and better suited to the changing times than the 
rigid and anachronistic class demarcations of political economy.  
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Fourth and finally, the objective-mechanical cosmology of the Newtonian and liberal 
revolutions started to fracture. In its stead came an indecisive worldview of 
uncertainty, risk and probability, of relative time/space, of an unsettling entanglement 
of particles and of a rather hazy separation between observer and reality. These 
developments have been used to justify further movements away from the scientific-
universal principles of political economy. Vitalism, ethnic identity and racism have all 
flourished in the name of cultural pluralism. Anti-scientists have challenged the so-
called binary ‘essentialism’ of ‘Eurocentrism’. Lord Bacon was dead. Ignorance has 
become strength.  
Suddenly, power was everywhere, and it contaminated everything. The anonymous 
market, measurable capital and class have all become suspect. The old categories 
seemed to be melting, along with the determinism that held them together. Political 
economy had entered a new, uncharted territory. (42-44) 
Can Marxism overcome these challenges? Most Marxists think it can, but the task certainly 
looks Sisyphean.  
Class and Class Conflict 
Marx anchored class in production. Human beings, he said, use tools to mediate their 
relationship with nature, and those tools – or means of production – end up mediating their 
relationships with each other. In this way, the political anthropology of ‘man the maker’ 
became the objective foundation of class analysis. The most fundamental social conflict is 
always between those who own the means of production and those who don’t, between the 
class that produces the surplus and the one that appropriates it. For Marx, this production-
driven class conflict is the ultimate engine of human history. 
During the monarchic-feudal era, human beings were classified according to their designated 
role in production – from the peasants and landed nobility of the countryside to the merchants, 
manufacturers and ‘blue nail’ labourers of the bourg. Marx extended this classification into the 
modern era. Feudalism, he argued, had given way to a new ‘mode of production’, and this new 
order generated two new conflict-bound classes: the productive workers who ran the 
industrial machinery and the capitalists who owned it.  
Now, unlike in earlier modes of production, where the surplus was confiscated directly, in 
capitalism it is appropriated symbolically through the price system, and this valorisation 
makes capitalism infinitely more complex and difficult to decipher than earlier class societies. 
To start with, the industrial class struggle affects capitalists in a very roundabout way. 
Whereas workers are said to be concerned mainly with their material standard of living, 
capitalists are driven by the emblematic rate of profit and pace of accumulation. These 
numerical indices are anything but straightforward. According to Marx’s labour theory of 
value, they are supposed to translate and reduce the numerous material facets of production 
into singular accounting quantities, but the practical rituals through which they are derived 
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are often highly arbitrary and far from objective. And that’s not the end of it. The rates of profit 
and accumulation supposedly influence – and some say ultimately determine – the so-called 
non-economic spheres of culture, religion, politics and international relations. But this impact, 
which is rarely if ever spelled out in the foundational Marxists texts, is highly conjectural and 
difficult to pin down. 
For example, what is the connection between the rate of exploitation of ‘productive’ Hollywood 
workers – assuming that these workers can be identified and their exploitation measured – 
and the rise of nearly risk-free blockbuster cinema? Or how is the rate of return on oil related 
to the ebb and flow of Jihadism in the Middle East and the exploits of armed militias such as 
ISIS? And what is the link between the profitability of U.K ‘industrial’ corporations – provided 
that this category is still meaningful – and U.K. Middle East policy?  
As we see it, the problem with these questions is that they ‘rig’ their answers, forcing the 
researcher, from the very start, into rigid economistic/productivist definitions of class, class 
struggle and accumulation. This problem doesn’t exist in CasP. The notion that capital is power 
eliminates the division between ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’. There is no longer any need to 
separate economics from politics, real from financial capital and productive from 
unproductive labour. There is no requirement to distinguish necessary labour from the 
surplus value it gives rise to, or to differentiate between concrete labour and the SNALT units 
of which it is supposedly made. These concepts, although still decorating the Marxist literature, 
have lost much of their logical coherence and operational usefulness.   
In Marx, accumulation and therefore the class struggle are anchored in the creation and 
realization of surplus value, which in turn means that, if accumulation indeed drives capitalist 
society, all power relations must somehow be reduced, or at least linked, to production. Not so 
in CasP. Here, the accumulation of capital is a conflictual power process to start with – and an 
encompassing one at that. This view means that every power process – and not just ‘economic’ 
ones – that bears on expected earnings is discounted into capital values and in that sense 
becomes part and parcel of capital. In this context, class and class conflict are categories of 
capital as power to begin with: they are not related to accumulation; they constitute it.  
Capitalized power is not a ‘thing’ in and of itself. It is not a ‘factor’ in a production function, an 
entity that ‘contributes’ – along with land, labour, machines and technology – to the economy 
and accumulation. It is not a ‘scarce resource’ to be ‘allocated’ or fought over. It is not a 
qualitative entity, but a quantitative relationship between entities. Capitalized power is the basic 
conflictual binary of force/defiance that makes up capitalist society; it is the fundamental 
relationship that constitutes the distinct capitalized entities as well as the capitalized space in 
which they exist and which they shape. Take, for example, Wells Fargo, the world’s largest 
financial holding group by market value. In 2015, the group’s capitalization of $264 billion – 
roughly 0.5 per cent of the world’s stock-market capitalization and 0.1 per cent of all 
capitalized assets – quantified its relative power. It reflected Wells Fargo’s present and 
expected relationships of conflict/alliance/resistance with a long list of entities – from 
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depositors and borrowers, to suppliers and buyers, to employees and clients, investors and 
corporations, governments and international organization – as well as the ways in which these 
numerous relationships creordered and were in turn creordered by capitalist society at large.   
CasP does not distinguish economic determinism from political voluntarism. Unlike Marx’s 
capitalist mode of production, whose relations of production need to be linked to and 
connected with other, ‘non-economic’ forms of conflict, the capitalist mode of power is a single, 
albeit multidimensional, process of creordering conflict. This creordering certainly 
encompasses labour and production, among other things; but it encompasses them only 
insofar as they impact the power underpinnings of capitalization.  
In the contemporary Marxist framework, the ruling class comprises the owners of the ‘means 
of production’ augmented by auxiliary political and cultural groups à la Gramsci. In this 
division of labour, the former group controls the production and realization of surplus value 
while the latter enforce on the ‘productive classes’ the false consciousness of capital, legitimize 
its legal rule and regulate its ‘social structure of accumulation’.  
CasP rejects this liberal-Marxist binary of ‘state/politics’ versus ‘civil society/economics’. 
Differential profit and capitalization quantify the ways in which capital creorders the power 
grid crisscrossing the whole of society; they measure and discount the manner in which capital 
shapes, delimits, redirects and strategically sabotages every aspect of social existence, in 
general and in detail.  
The differential power underpinnings of this process mean that, when thinking of the ruling 
class in capitalism, we need to consider not capital in general, but dominant capital in 
particular, while the universalizing nature of this power process suggests that this dominant 
capital comprises corporations as well as other key power organizations and institutions of 
society with which they are intertwined. It is impossible to think of JPMorgan Chase without 
the Fed, of ExxonMobil and Lockheed Martin without the Pentagon and the State Department, 
of the Japanese keiretsu and Korean chaebol without their respective governments – and of all 
these entities without the international organizations that connect and link them. These 
organizations and the people who own and control them constitute not a mechanical collection 
of distinct ‘economic’, ‘political’ and ‘cultural’ components, but a single hologram of capitalized 
power.  
Praxis and False Consciousness 
Marx distinguished between ‘class in itself’ and ‘class for itself’ – between the objective 
existence of a class and the subjective consciousness of those who belong to it. The two 
concepts are linked through praxis, whose ultimate realization comes when the mythical 
industrial proletariat, having realized its true class nature, fulfils its historical mission and 
appropriates the appropriators.  
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The empirical proletariat, though, doesn’t seem up to the task. The working masses, industrial 
and otherwise, do not appear overly eager to overthrow capitalism. Many of them prefer 
passive entertainment and shopping-till-dropping to engaged creativity and political activity. 
They are often xenophobic, nationalistic and racist, and they seem particularly hostile to guest 
workers. Disturbingly, a sizeable proportion of them holds on to capitalist principles and 
swears by laissez-faire slogans – often while supporting populist dictators, religious 
demagogues and conservative political parties.  
Overall, then, there seems to be somewhat of a gap between the theoretical praxis and the 
practical reality. The proletariat, it turns out, disregards its assigned historical task. It refuses 
to recognize its objective class position, let alone act accordingly, and the experts are still trying 
to figure out why. Many Marxist volumes – from Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness (1971) 
and Sartre’s Roads to Freedom trilogy to Marx and Engels’ German Ideology (1970) and 
Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man (1964) – have been devoted to this question, and while their 
explanations often differ considerably, they all point to the same malaise: the false 
consciousness of the laity. 
The curse of false consciousness isn’t new, of course, having besieged many a church 
throughout history. And it very much resembles the difficulties haunting the neoclassical faith 
of liberal capitalism. While in theory the perfectly competitive free market is always right, in 
practice it always fails. The problems, of course, are all ‘exogenous’ – or at least that’s what the 
priests of the neoclassical church keep saying. Equilibrium, they tell us, is upset by ‘external 
shocks’ and unfortunate ‘irrationalities’, supply is ‘distorted’ by monopolies and cartels, 
demand is ‘manipulated’ by advertisers and demagogues, market dynamics are ‘over-
regulated’ by governments and bureaucrats, innovations and enterprise are ‘suffocated’ by 
red-tape, costs are ‘artificially’ inflated by labour unions, oil sheiks and the weather gods and 
state budgets are bloated by duplicitous politicians who speak for the free market while acting 
against it. Everyone seems to betray the liberal market – yet somehow this treason, just like 
the false consciousness of the working class, works wonders for capitalist profits. 
CasP has neither laity nor infidels. It identifies no predestined laws of motion and assigns no 
historical missions. There are no theoretically inevitable crises to bring about true 
consciousness and political praxis. There is no need for fortune-tellers like Kondratiev to 
identify for leaders like Lenin the right time to trigger the ultimate world revolution, and there 
is no need for working-class prophets like Stalin to execute the treasonous experts when they 
happen to misread the objective omens.  
Unlike the capitalist mode of production, where the objective ‘material’ base conditions if not 
determines the conceptual-ideological-legal superstructure, in CasP the mode of power and 
concepts of power are enfolded in one another: the actual organization of society and the 
concepts through which this organization is conceived, described, constructed and criticized 
are intertwined.  
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The dynamics of capitalism and the limits, or asymptotes, of its power cannot be easily reduced 
to strictly ‘objective’ conditions. They depend on the ability of the rulers to force themselves 
on the rest of society – and the confidence they have in this ability. For this reason, crises in 
capitalism have much to do with the rulers’ fears – which, contrary to the Marxist vision, are 
not a fictitious element of financial irrationality, but a key dimension of capitalization and an 
integral aspect of accumulation. 
The rulers are no more rational or irrational than their subjects. Indeed, the remarkable 
resilience of capitalism hinges crucially on its ability to subjugate both rulers and ruled to the 
same operational symbol of capitalization.  
Earlier modes of power made hierarchy explicit and binding: they differentiated clearly 
between rulers and ruled, they limited and often prevented upward mobility and they 
generated and enforced significantly different mind sets on various social groups. Capitalism 
is very different in this sense. It is the only mode of power that denies power. It flattens the 
world. It renounces hierarchy and glorifies opportunity. It removes formal barriers to mobility 
and objects, at least in principle, to various forms of discrimination.  
The only legitimate differentiator is money. Its ultimate purpose is said to be wellbeing (‘better 
life’). All capitalist subjects are conditioned to cherish the singular principle of individual 
pleasure (‘standard of living’), taught how to quantify it (‘net worth’) and imagine that they try 
to maximize it (‘rate of return’). But they assess their success not directly but monetarily 
(‘being rich’), and they seek it not absolutely but differentially (‘beating the average’). In other 
words, they think hedonically but act conflictually, forcefully, violently. And it is the 
universality of this duality – the fact that everyone, from capitalists and workers, to politicians 
and bureaucrats, to the unemployed and the criminal, live and die by it – that makes praxis so 
elusive. 
In Nineteen Eighty Four, George Orwell mocked Marx by turning his class-conscious proletariat 
into mindless proles locked in an infinite loop: ‘until they become conscious they will never 
rebel, and until after they have rebelled they cannot become conscious’ (1948: 70). But 
become conscious of what and rebel against whom? In the Soviet Union, the backdrop for 
Orwell’s novel, the answer may have been pretty obvious. But in capitalism, where, on the face 
of it, rulers and ruled obey the same logic, are conditioned by the same values and believe they 
are driven by the same goals, the answer is not that simple.  
Bridgehead 
These considerations make praxis crucially dependent on fusing political action with ongoing 
empirical and theoretical research. To illustrate this necessity to know what we are doing, 
consider the following thought experiment. What if, instead of creordering the entire fabric of 
society, we start with a narrow bridgehead? Rather than trying to revolutionize the whole 
thing, we focus on one well-defined sphere. We inject into this sphere greater autonomy, 
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cooperation and creativity, and then gradually tie these changes with, pull in and transform 
additional social spheres and processes, as well as our very understanding of society.  
One promising site for such a bridgehead is the intersection of housing and pensions. The rapid 
urbanization of the planet makes affordable housing a key concern – and increasingly an 
impossible dream – for most wage earners. Similarly with pensions. According to the 
International Labour Organization, the vast majority of the world’s working-age population – 
up to 90 per cent – is not covered by pension schemes capable of providing adequate 
retirement income (Gillion et al. 2000). Left unattended, these trends are akin to social time-
bombs. Used wisely, though, they might offer a leverage for autonomous social change 
around the world.  
If we could come up with a democratically managed system that ploughs pension 
contributions into affordable housing and uses mortgage repayments and rent to pay 
pensioners, we might be able to align with and mobilize large chunks of society. And that’s 
just for starters. Affordable housing can be tied to sustainable urban planning, with creative 
architecture and new forms of public transportation to counteract and reverse the ecological 
devastation ushered in by uncontrollable sprawl. Those who live in autonomously developed 
urban areas and experience the democratic process might in turn wish to reform the 
educational system and broaden their self-government. The conceptual challenges created 
by a democratically managed pension-housing system might give rise to alternative 
accounting methods based on computations of public welfare rather than individual utility. 
Success in any of these areas could spill over into other areas of society, while failure would 
encourage rethinking and exploring of alternative routes. What started as a mere bridgehead 
could gradually expand into a broad creordering of society at large.  
Can this thought experiment be translated into praxis? Perhaps – but only if we are able to 
conceive, develop and implement it in conjunction with ongoing empirical and theoretical 
research.   
There are three related reasons for this requirement. One is that the changes outlined above 
constitute a direct assault on the capitalist mode of power: to democratize housing is to 
undermine the concentration of private real-estate ownership and management; to 
withdraw pension funds from the stock market is to arrest asset-price inflation and deprive 
capitalists of the nearly total leverage they have over middle-class incomes and the middle-
class way of life; to demonstrate the efficacy of self-management in more and more realms 
of society is to delegitimize the sanctity of private enterprise and sound the death knell for 
accumulation.  
So dominant capital and its power belt of government officials, economists and public-
opinion makers are bound to fight this process nail and tooth. They will dismiss its 
underpinnings and attack its supporters. They will thwart its planning and sabotage its 
implementation. They will use sticks and carrots, brainwashing and threats, persuasion and 
 
 
56 
 
Theory and Praxis, Theory and Practice, Practical Theory 
violence. There is no way for us to withstand, resist and overcome these attacks without 
understanding – in general and in detail – the power logic they obey and the power 
structures they mobilize. And that understanding requires relentless, in-depth research.   
Another reason is that even if we succeed and see our bridgehead gaining traction and 
spreading into other areas of society, initially these areas will have to coexist and interact 
with parallel structures of capitalist power. To put this parallelism in context, note that the 
modern capitalist principles of investment and accounting, discounting and finance and 
wage labour and increasing efficiency emerged in the early part of the second millennium 
AD, but that until very recently – perhaps as late as the nineteenth century – they operated 
within and alongside the logic of feudalism. And if that proves to be the case with post-
capitalist alternatives, our praxis will depend crucially on understanding the ever-changing 
dynamics of capitalist power in which these alternatives exist.  
Last but not least, enfolding research with praxis could boost the morale and optimism of 
progressive groups around the world. To show that democratic schemes such as pension-
supported housing can actually work – i.e., that they serve the autonomy and wellbeing of 
their members while weakening the power logic of capital – is to demonstrate that we 
understand capitalism and can do better; that alternatives to capitalism can be imagined, 
planned and implemented.  
This understanding, however, is difficult if not impossible to gain when we embrace academic 
dogma, cling to outdated political slogans and shun empirical research. The only way to 
achieve it – certainly on any meaningful scale – is through a series of autonomous, non-
academic research institutes that are informed by and cater to societal action. These are not 
mere sidekicks. In our complex world, they have become a prerequisite for effective praxis.  
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